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As already mentioned, many composers have 'tried their hand' at game theory. 
One who, with the advantage of both mathematical training and musical ability, 
has often combined them successfully is Iannis Xenukis, the GreE:k--bor:a co:;lpoGer, 
In this article, we intend to deal only vli th his use of game theory in the works 
(1958-59), and in a more complicated, though similarly constructed, work, 
Stra tegie ( 1962). Both works are written for tvm orchestras, each with a 
conductor . The two orchestras compete according to rules described by Xenakis 
in his book Formalized Music (London 1971). 
In this book the composer describes his use of the 'two-person zero-sum game' 
in these two works, and this tern1 had better be explained in more detail before 
continuing. A small, but necessary point is that this description may refer to 
something played by individuals, or by t1v0 tea'Ils, using the word 'person 1 
rather like lc.vzy-ers do when they apply it to a company. The essence is that 
there are two sides. One cru1 visualise the two conductors more or less 
competing against one another, ec.ch using his o1,;n orchestra as his instrument. 
The term 'zero-sum' refers to the method of scoring. In simple terms it means 
that one side's gain is the other side's loss, so that if you add up the total 
gain and loss of both a t nny time, they will balance out. A does not 
have to be 'zero-sum 1 , though many (especially gambling games) are. 
In Duel the composer has provided five musical entities •Nhich he calls 'events'. 
These are: 
E-vent I 
Event II 
1'vent Ill 
Event IV 
Event V 
Event VI 
A cluster of sonic grains such as pizzicati, blows with the 
i-rooden part of the bow, and very brief arco sounds distributed 
stochastically. 
Parallel sustained strings >rith fluctuations. 
Netvmrks of intert1nning string glissandi. 
Stochastic percussion sounds. 
Stochastic wind instrument sounds . 
Silence. 
The conductors direct -vri th their backs to each other, and an 1 exchange 1 consists 
of each one choosing an event and directing his section to play it. The 
complete ga..rne consists of a series of exchanges . The 'events' are thus played 
in pairs,, and each pair i.s evaluated as pleasant, or unpleasant to hear. 
For example: 
I with V is rated ve;r.y: good +l-g 
while 
II with III is rated J2assable p 
also 
I with I is rated J2assable p 
Note that if one conductor chooses I, the other can produce a iride range 
of qualities. He can so as to produce a combination that might only 
be p but might be g • Now i-Te come to the first curious situation. Let 
us call the conductors X and Y. Then X is to try to choose so as to 
secure the best combinations, ru1d Y is to oppose him by trying to secure 
the poorest. This certainly introduces an element of conflict into the 
:situation, but its effect in producing a musical performance which is pleasing, 
or otherwise, is obscure. Conflict, ho·wever, is required if the perfonnance 
is to be analysed according to the mathewatical theory of games.. Anyway 1 here is the complete table of evaluations: 
(Y) 
I II III IV V VI 
I ++ + + p g g g g p 
II + g p p g p p 
III ++ + g p p g g 
(x) 
IV + + g g g p g p 
V + + g p g g p p 
VI p p p p p p 
Now suppose X1 s choice is doi'ln the side and Y's is along the top. 
Obviously y can do pretty i'i'ell: all he needs to do is choose column VI 
all the time and i'Tha t ever X does the combination will either be passable 
(p) or worse (p-). 
So far the game looks a pretty poor one. So the mathematical manipulations 
begin, using theory. Here we YA.nt to spare you the details, but we will 
have to trJ to give you sorrie idea of what is going on. Firstly, mathematical 
game operates 1rith 1payoffs' rather than qualitative ones. 
Xenakis therefore quantifies according to what he describes as 'a rough 
numerical scale': 
p 
0 
p + p 
2 
g 
3 
+ g 
4 
++ g 
5 
9 
It is -v;orth noting that if he used a different sc::tl e everything the;.t folloHs 
could turn out differently. For example, he could have gL ven much greater 
weight to the preferabl·3 qualities Hi th the scale: 
p 
0 
p 
1 
+ .P 
2 
_g 
4 
+ g 
8 
++ g 
16 
Why choose one ro.ther than the other? We don 't know and he doesn't say. 
The of the evaluations is the following square array of 
numbers, called a 'matrix': 
(Y) 
I II III IV V VI 
I 3 5 4 4 
.... 
IT 3 3 2 
III 5 4 3 
(x) 
IV . 4 3 4 3 
V 4 2 3 3 
VI 0 
The gains and losses are now 'i'i"Orkecl out according to this matrix, at each 
1 exchange 1 • For example, if X chooses III (look dmm the side) and 
Y chooses I (look along the top) ,.,e see that in the row ond column 
chosen the figure is 5. fi re is the amount Y must a to X. 
The game is a zero-sum bne because the total of · X' s gain plus 5 and 
Y's loss (minus 5) is zero, and so on for any other pair of choices . 
Let us abbreviate the choj_ce just described as (III, I); then (I, III) 
will mean that X chooses I and Y chooses III. Note that on (I, III) 
Y must still pay 5 to X vihich is a kind of symmetry, and this game is 
at present throughout (check, for example, the score 3 on both 
(IV, II) and (II, IV)). 
Xenakis now proceeds in stages to modify the matrix to produce a game that 
posses1:3es further game-theoretic Some of the modifications look 
pretty arbitrary. For example, his very first step is, -w-ithout comment, to · 
modify the score on (VI, VI) from 0 (which is p -) to 3 (which is g). 
Note that this pair is the peculiar one si2.ence v,. silence, and it seems ·at · 
least likely that a change in your evaluation of that is going to change 
the game considerably. 
The game at the moment looks -oretty poor for Y, because all 'payoffs' 
(und.;r c;tood as from Y to X) are positive or' zero. Thus X can never 
lose and Y can never gain., You might say this serves Y right, since 
his role is to try to get the least sounds played? but this is not 
the idea, and at a later stage Xenalds levels things up by making some · 
'payoffs' negative (X pays YL However, a prel.iminary step is to break 
the symmetry. For whereas, before, the payoff on {IV, II) and 
(II, IV) -vras 31 he takes E) as 4,. keeping (II, IV) as 3. He 
also again quietly jacks up the payoff on ·(vi, VI)· or silence v" silence 
from 3 to 4, but he doesn't say anything about that, He prints a whole 
sequence of matrices embodying these and subsequent modifications, but: we 
will not reproduce them all, since they can bs found in Formalized JVIusic. 
His next step brings in probabilities. Here we will try to keep things 
elementary, but we must ask you to held on to your hats and try to stay -.vi th 
us. 
Some games are rather dull, in that there is a 'best' thing (called 'strntegy') 
that each playec:- can adopt each time they play the game. Look back to the 
matrix and you will see that Y might as well play VI (silence) every 
time. Then X can play anythi.ng from I to V and the pal?ff >rill be 
1 (=p) wh:i.le if' he plays VI then the payoff is zero (=p J >'lhich is 
even better for Y. 
Other games are better balanced between the two players , Hanipulations 
which we will omi.t lead Xenakis to a nmv payoff ma.trix. It is delivered 
from the old one as we said above, it allows both positive payoffs 
(Y pays X) and negative ones (X pays :.), which makes sense. Other 
adjustments have been made in 'i!ays which are consistent >vi th the requirements 
of game theory. The result is shown on ..._ c ,, r; · :: page. 
Novr the situation has radically changed. A ... YJ. o hv-ic'J.sly good column for Y 
to piay is VI (still silence)·. because he uig.'lt \·;in 3 from X if Y 
chose ·III j and ·would 1-rin 1 if X chose anything ·out 'lL But. if X 
knows-··' ,. Y- chosen VI so .. :'lill and he wilJ. 1.;ig __ ) fr<2!lL . ..I• 
The point is that if one player knmvs, or even guess,· the other's 
str?-tegy, he can vrin" It is pretty obvious that what boirc_ of them should· 
do is to keep all the time to baffle the other. X should choose 
which are good for. him often, but not too often or Y will rumble him, 
so he must mix in all -the choices. SirnilarJ_y for Yo 
V"Jhat is less obvious, but is one of the most fundamente.l and most interesting 
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(Y) 
I II III IV V VI 
I -1 +1 +3 ..:.1 +1 -1 
II +1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 
III +3 -1 -3 +5 +1 -3 
(x) 
. IV -1 +3 +3 -1 -1 -1 
V +1 -1 +1 +1 -l -1 
VI -1 -1 -3 -1 -1 +3 
theort:n s Gf g::1ne theory, is tha t there is a best or 1opti.Ollli'l 1 proportion in 
which X should pl ay the vru:-ious str::ctegic-s I t o VI, and also an.. optimum · 
(though in different proportirms) f or Y. To avoid having his opponent 
detect his V>.tt8rn of plo.y (in which case the opponent could ir:1prove his 
chances), each- one should pl ay his choices in a r nnd::m sequence, but .working 
it so ns t o bnlmce out in the long run t o his optinlli'l proportions (called 
his 1 crptin.mn Dixed strategy 1 if you ever want t o look up s one no re g::u::1e 
theory). The proportions f or Xenokis 1 g::t.rne are: ·. · 
Stra t egy 
X 
y 
I 
14 
:19 
II 
6 
7 
III 
6 
6 
IV 
6 
1. 
V 
s · 
7 
VI 
16 
16 
(all out of 56) 
:mother point, which we have not nentioned, tha t helps - t o guide Xenukis' 
nanipulations is th::tt he tries to nru{e his gone 'fair'. This is nQt the 
sane as lift er all, you could lay 2 to 1 (your gain is your 
opponent's loss) on an even ooney ch3.nce like coin tossing, but you would be 
r :-tther f oolish t o do so. ;;.t es.ch exchange your g2in is y c;ur opponent's loss 
and vice versn , but on aver2.ge he wins 2 half the tine and only loses 1 
for the other half, so on the whole he will gain steadily. because 
he tries to keep his payoffs as sinple small wh ole mmbers, which do not 
nllow verJ fine ndjustnents, Xenikis ends up with a that, on avera ge md 
in the long tern, gives Y about a 7.% - r ather better thnn the 
nd.v '"' nt!..cge of 2 in 35 tho.t is tJ.k:en Dt r rmlette, tradi tbnnlly, by casinos. 
So Xennkis stops there, and proceeds t o the analysis of Strategic. 
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Strategie is a similar game but much more complex: each conductor has a 
choice of 19 events instead of 6 (they are made up of 6 basic events and 
some compounds of these), His analysis is much briefer and includes 
proposals for simplif.ying the scoring system so that all of the 
19 x 19 = 361 choices need not be ,examined otherwise it is 
basically the same. For both games, Xenakis also provides a few suggestions 
of a purely organisational such as the provision of referees or 
scorers• prior decision by the conductors to play for a fixed number of 
minutes or a fixed number of engagements, and so on. 
So what are we to conclude from this? Xenakis has certainly achieved one 
thing: he has written two works with a clearly defined plan to produce 
substantial differences in what the audience hears each time they are 
performed. If you (and we do) that music which essentially varies 
from one performance to another has an attraction, like a mobile sculpture, 
then this is good. 
On the other hand, if we have managed to make -our an£uysis .ut least partly 
clear, we are sure you trill recognise that there is a strongly mechanistic 
element in the successive modifications he makes to his 'payoff matrix'. He 
commits himself to follow a set of rules which lead him to a game which has 
certain qualities f airness) which belong to game theory. He . says 
nlmost nothing about whether he thinks these game-theoretic qualities 
correspond to aesthetically pleasing qualities in an actual performance. 
Perhaps he does not care. Almost the sole exception is a remark on page 
118 of Formalized Music: 
"The sonic processes derived from the two experiments are, moreover, 
satisfactory". \'le think this could be correctly translated as: "It 
sounded quite good when we played it". 
In the present day climate of opinion many people not find this 
po.rticularly significant. Vlhat may disturb some people more is that we 
seem to be approaching what is sometimes referred to (pejoratively) as 
'machine music 1 • Ue rove emphasised the way in which Xenakis develops 
these two works by adopting a strict set of rules (those of gru1e theory) 
and apparently letting them load where they will. We did so deliberately, 
because this is centrnl portion of the picture. But is not all of it, 
and we must redress the balance • .. ' 
Firstly, like most systems of ln w, the rules allm'i more initiative to sm':J.eone 
who is ;:mster of then than might appear at first glance. Secondly, we both . 
believe that he is doing something very inportant by bringing into one · of the 
arts ideas which are central to present-day scientific thinking, and are 
constantly spreading into other fields. We are noving into a period when 
vm must think in tems of fluidity, variable performance and probability, 
and the tools for dealing with these include the theories of games and of 
stochastic processes. Not only econonists and census-takers, but engineers 
and all of us living in an uncertain world are being forced to 
accept the necessity of this new mode of thought. It will inevitably 
influence the arte and Xenak:is has shown himself as a leader in absorbing 
this UU'luence. 
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